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Natural ChemE » October 12th, 2015, 11:31 am wrote:Ursa Minimus,
I'd like to thank you for showing a good example of a Sociology paper. This does look like one of the better works in the field, and since I feel that fields should generally be viewed in terms of their merits, this paper is a great look into Sociology.
A quick peek at the paper suggests to me that it's basically a framework based on graph theory in which nodes are social entities and branches are relationships. This is a pretty common framework through the human knowledge pool, so there're a lot of relationships that we can draw to other existing theories. These relationships can be useful since many of the tools developed for one framework can be applied across frameworks.
Some of the more obvious relationships include:It's pretty common when working in frameworks like this to keep using them when they're sufficient, then to extend them as necessary to account for phenomena that can't be fit into the basic framework itself. I'm sure that you're well aware of this, so I'd be curious, what sorts of generalizations are commonly applied to this framework in modern literature? For example, has there been a movement toward considering stuff like:
- Steady state.
There's no explicit time dependence.
- May be asserted to be pseudo-steady state.
- May be arrived at through a more rigorous approach by asserting a kinetic model and driving time
.
- A good example of this generalization is in how electric circuits are taught. Generally electric circuits are introduced as steady state graphs, then generalized to time dependence.
- Chemical system kinetics also follows this path.
- Graphically first-order.
Directional relationships are functions of single nodes.
- May be arrived at by asserting a graphically higher-order framework, then limiting scope to first-order relationships.
See also:- Logically first-order.
The underlying logic system does not build itself.
- Knowledge about first-order logic can be applied, including first-order logic for graphs.
- May be arrived at from a more general framework by removing higher-order principles.
- Non-stochastic.
No randomness.
- May be arrived at from a more general framework by assuming static values for all points of randomness.
For applications, this framework's neat in that it can form a theoretical underpinning for welfare economics. For example, if
- kinetics; or
- stochastics; or
- higher-order relationships?
sells
some product in a free market, then obviously both sides perceive benefit from the transaction (or else wouldn't conduct it). But if the product is of very low value to
and of very high value to
, then the transaction can happen at a wide range of prices while still being agreeable to both parties; so how does that price get determined? As far as I've seen in my MBA studies, this isn't a well-answered question in the context of microeconomics (though consistent-pricing constraints help address it in macroeconomics), though I can see how your consideration of networks could go toward coming up with a consistent, predictive framework for answering it.
Noting generalizability should help answer this question since, at the macro-limit, the micro-framework should reduce to the known solutions of profit optimization that tend to work pretty well when we're talking commodities. This would be a consistency principle like how quantum mechanics reduces to classical mechanics at the macro-limit.
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Natural ChemE » October 14th, 2015, 4:44 pm wrote:Ursa Minimus,
Back when we were talking about reductionism, an important point for me was that we're all basically computers. We can make predictive models/theories only because the phenomena that we're describing are approximately reproducible within our own brains.
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BioWizard » October 16th, 2015, 7:04 am wrote:
All that said, why is the interplay between the mind and society an argument for the irreduciblity of the system? Maybe our alternate views are caused by what each of us is considering as the complete system under consideration?
As an example of extreme simplicity, you can't explain the behavior of hydrogen atoms in water without incorporating the properties of oxygen, just as you can't reduce the behavior of salt ions in solution without the solvent (salts behave very differently in vacuum). So why would we be able to reduce the social behavior of humans without the social milieu? And why does that necessarily mean that social behavior is irreducible? Or that the social milieu has no underlying structure with certain rules that govern its evolution? I personally see sociology as a critical component of a possible reductionist approach down the line rather than being at odds with it, since it tells us what we may need to know about the "milieu".
Language and Culture
An integral part of any culture is its language. Language not only develops in conjunction with a society's historical, economic and political evolution; it also reflects that society's attitudes and thinking. ...
...A Short Play on "Black" and "White" Words
Some may blackly (angrily) accuse me of trying to blacken (defame) the English language, to give it a black eye(a mark of shame) by writing such black words (hostile). They may denigrate (to cast aspersions; to darken) me by accusing me of being blackhearted (malevolent), of having a black outlook (pessimistic, dismal) on life, of being a blackguard (scoundrel)‑which would certainly be a black mark (detrimental fact) against me. Some may black‑brow (scowl at) me and hope that a black cat crosses in front of me because of this black deed. I may become a black sheep (one who causes shame or embarrassment because of deviation from the accepted standards), who will be blackballed (ostracized) by being placed on a blacklist (list of undesirables) in an attempt to blackmail (to force or coerce into a particular action) me to retract my words. But attempts to blackjack (to compel by threat) me will have a Chinaman's chance of success, for I am not a yellow‑bellied Indian‑giver of words, who will whitewash (cover Lip or gloss over vices or crimes) a black lie (harmful, inexcusable). 1 challenge the purity and innocence (white) of the English language. I don't see things in black and white (entirely bad or entirely good) terns, for I am a white man (marked by upright firmness) if there ever was one. However, it would be a black clay when I would not "call a spade a spade," even though some will suggest a white man calling the English language racist is like the pot calling the kettle black. While many may he niggardly (grudging, scanty) in their support, others will be honest and decent‑and to them I say, that's very white of you (honest, decent).
The preceding is of course a white lie (not intended to cause harm), meant only to illustrate some examples of racist terminology in the English language.
Racial labels often define how social groups are perceived. The current research utilized both archival and experimental methods to explore the consequences of the “Black” vs. “African-American” racial labels on Whites' evaluations of racial minorities. We argue that the racial label Black evokes a mental representation of a person with lower socioeconomic status than the racial label African-American, and that Whites will react more negatively toward Blacks (vs. African-Americans). In Study 1, we show that the stereotype content for Blacks (vs. African-Americans) is lower in status, positivity, competence, and warmth. In Study 2, Whites view a target as lower status when he is identified as Black vs. African-American. In Study 3, we demonstrate that the use of the label Black vs. African-American in a US Newspaper crime report article is associated with a negative emotional tone in that respective article. Finally, in Study 4, we show that Whites view a criminal suspect more negatively when he is identified as Black vs. African-American. The results establish how racial labels can have material consequences for a group.
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BioWizard » October 16th, 2015, 8:14 am wrote:I should elaborate that, by extension of what I said above, I do agree that sociology is unlikely to be entirely reducible to human biology. Just like it's not possible to reduce the structure of a beaver dam entirely to beaver biology. The beaver is but one component in the system that gives rise to, and erodes, the dam (which I suppose could also be modeled kinetically, while paying heed to the dynamic interaction between the beaver and its dam).
My thought here is that:
and
By the way, I make those comments and ask those questions specifically because you've said that you believe in the utility of a scientific approach to this kind of problems. So I'm curious to know more about how all these things fit together from your perspective.
Also, really cute new avatar.
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Ursa Minimus » 21 Oct 2015 07:17 am wrote:Bio,
Sociology was founded on the assumption that social effects are not reducible to psychological/biological effects (your first sense). That's core to the discipline, and so sociologists look to find such effects. And look to show how they are not reducible to psychological/biological processes, often by using psych/bio factors as control variables. A good amount of soc looks to explain what SEEMS to be reducible on the surface to show it really isn't (showing what is claimed to be your second sense really is the first sense).
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