Human Memory is not Space Disk. Is it an attitude?

[henriette]

Facts :
-We can remember scenes of our lives that represent a gigantic amount of data.
-There is no particular data storage devices in the human brain.


This may be because what we call memory is just an attitude and radically differs from the memory disk of our computer. When we remember, our body puts arguably itself in an physiological attitude that renews the images of the past. It acts just like a black coffee drop that would find its way back through the percolation process and feel again transparency.

[Lomax]

Hello henriette,

-There is no particular data storage devices in the human brain.

What about the frontal lobe?

Lomax

[neuro]

Facts :
-We can remember scenes of our lives that represent a gigantic amount of data.
-There is no particular data storage devices in the human brain.

Facts: there are 300 billion neurons in the brain; they may receive up to 10,000 synaptic contacts each, which makes some 1.000,000 billion (10¹⁵) synapses; there are some 1,000 proteins at each synapse which may be present or not and more or less active, all this (and synapse formation and elimination) being regulated as a function of neuronal activity. Wildly simplifying, and only considering some 1000 on/off switches at each synapse, the whole makes some 10¹⁸ "switches". Now consider that a supercomputer has some 100 terabytes memory storage or so, i.e. some 8x10¹⁴ bits: this means that even in this very conservative estimate a human brain has a storage/computation "room" corresponding to some 1000 supercomputers...

Still, I think your feeling is more or less correct:

This may be because what we call memory is just an attitude and radically differs from the memory disk of our computer. When we remember, our body puts arguably itself in an physiological attitude that renews the images of the past. It acts just like a black coffee drop that would find its way back through the percolation process and feel again transparency.

Actually, the brain does not store and retrieve information as a computer does. Some information is momentarily stored to be used, and this constitutes what we call "working memory" (the last phonemes while you are interpreting language, a telephone number you keep in mind for a minute). But the general functioning of memory is different: when a certain pattern of activity occurs in the brain in an emotionally relevant situation, or if it occurs repetitively, the activity pattern tends to become "fixed" and easily elicited if the circuit is somehow activated (these is what Edelman refers to as "reentrant maps"). Thus, what is stored is not "data" but the tendency to reproduce a pattern of activity, and when a "memory" is recalled the brain kind of reproduces the activity that occurred when the "memory" was acquired.
The brain replays its own old "perspective", the "state" and activity which it went through at that moment.
(and it reproduces it in a circuitry that has changed in the meantime: this is why memory is so tricky and imprecise)

If this is more or less what you mean by "attitude", then yes, recalling memories is an "attitude"...

[Lomax]

hello neuro,

Actually, the brain does not store and retrieve information as a computer does. Some information is momentarily stored to be used, and this constitutes what we call "working memory" (the last phonemes while you are interpreting language, a telephone number you keep in mind for a minute). But the general functioning of memory is different: when a certain pattern of activity occurs in the brain in an emotionally relevant situation, or if it occurs repetitively, the activity pattern tends to become "fixed" and easily elicited if the circuit is somehow activated (these is what Edelman refers to as "reentrant maps"). Thus, what is stored is not "data" but the tendency to reproduce a pattern of activity, and when a "memory" is recalled the brain kind of reproduces the activity that occurred when the "memory" was acquired.

I'm no computer scientist, but I was under the impression that this is exactly what a computer does. When we say data is stored on the hard drive, we do not mean that anything is actually written down; it is rather that the computer "knows", in the future, which nodes and routes of circuitry to activate.

Lomax

[neuro]

I'm no computer scientist, but I was under the impression that this is exactly what a computer does. When we say data is stored on the hard drive, we do not mean that anything is actually written down; it is rather that the computer "knows", in the future, which nodes and routes of circuitry to activate.

Exactly is a STRONG word, isn'tit?
There certainly are some analogies.
But what is written in the computer memory is actually written, in terms of 1's and 0's (differences in magnetizarion of memory cells). These numbers are loaded in the registers of the CPU and either interpreted as instructions or used as data (in executing instructions).
There might be writing and reading errors, but except from those what is written is written.
In our brain, neurons that are connected and discharge in phase (with the same temporal pattern) tend to strengthen (in some cases to weaken) their connection, so that nex time a neuron of the circuit is activated the whole circuit may reproduce the "learned" pattern of activity.
What one tends to overlook is that most neurons participate of many such circuits, so that the changes in the connections in one circuit (which should facilitate reproducing a pattern of activity which has been repetitively encountered) usually affect other circuits as well. The consequence is that when you try and reproduce a learned neuronal activity pattern ("recall a memory") you do it with a circuitry that has been changing in the time that has elapsed since it was "fixed": the result is that your memory is recalled different from how it was stored.
This may appear as a defect, but it increases the efficiency in learning by some orders of magnitude: whenever you learn a new pattern (experience, information, whatever) you only have to "connect" subpatterns that you already possess. These get a little changed, but you just need to "save" an infinitesimal amount of the information you get.
The result is that the more you know (and understand) the more easily you learn and memorize, because you just have to add little bits of information to an already existing rich network of connections. The result is also that you hear what you want to hear, you tend to confirm your knowledge and overlook what contradicts it, etc. (well not YOU, Lomax!, I mean WE do).
This would not be the case for a computer. No "incremental learning" there (a part from certain software which actually tries to simulate the working of our brain..)

[owleye]

Though I have broad interests in memory and on another day would like to contribute to the particular orientation of memory currently being addressed, I'd like instead to toss out a realization that occurred to over a recent lunch with my wife. It is not uncommon for older folks (such as ourselves) to worry about losing memory. (For an interesting trip down this alley, one might watch "Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind".) Being the sort of person I am, I take great interest in all the data points associated with such losses. One thing I've concluded, and is probably no surprise to researchers and especially those working with Alzheimer's patients, is that it is easier to hold onto the need to do something than it is to hold onto its satisfaction. We more easily remember to check that the door is locked than it is to remember that we checked it and so we check it again. Another example is that we find it easier when at the grocery store to remember we need dog food than remembering we already purchased it and so wind up with having two bags. (I think this has something to do with the emotional content (or level of desire or fear) attached to it.)

James

[neuro]

Owleye, as usual you seem to get a bit off topic, but instead you spot a quite interesting and pertinent aspect.

it is easier to hold onto the need to do something than it is to hold onto its satisfaction. We more easily remember to check that the door is locked than it is to remember that we checked it and so we check it again. Another example is that we find it easier when at the grocery store to remember we need dog food than remembering we already purchased it and so wind up with having two bags. (I think this has something to do with the emotional content (or level of desire or fear) attached to it.)

I think the different kinds of "memories" you are talking about are typical examples of a difference between the "computing mode" and memory of a computer and ours.
Actually, you are comparing our "memory" to perform almost automatic tasks and "memory" of having performed them, and the two have pretty different mechanisms and properties.
The first kind of "memory" is mostly conditioned behavior: you get out of your home and "automatically" lock the door, you get into the store and buy dog food. It is the result of psychomotor learning, as is the procedure to drive your car from home to the work. These tasks are performed with almost no cortical control (just a kind of vague supervision and evaluation of compatibility with other tasks or so), mostly guided by the cerebellum. So they leave almost no trace in memory (the second kind of "memory" you are talking of, i.e. recalling having performed the act). This is why, if you cannot find your keys, it is very difficult to reconstruct the sequence of your (automatic) movements in leaving your house to figure out whether and where you may have dropped the keys, or whether you put them in some unusual pocket or funny place.

On the other hand, the point you raise about need and satisfaction is of paramount interest. I do not think this is particularly relevant with respect to memory, but "need" and "satisfaction" play very different roles in our gratificatinal balance and in motivational control of behavior, mostly in terms of urgency versus possibility of postponing, pleasure of prefiguring and looking forward to, sublimation and correct decisional behavior.
This is a problem made particularly acute by stress (which creates a situation of malaise and urgency, so that one needs some kind of gratification right away, whatever it be) and sustains bulimia (both the feeding disturbance and the general "bulimia" for consumables, goods, entertainment that characterizes our society) as a "need" for something which should instead be a "desire" (a desirable pleasure). Mostly, this is the insoluble problem with any form of addiction; in fact addiction ensues when the drug (or smoke, gambling, or whatever else) is no more looked for because it gives pleasure, but because one needs it, which dismantels the possibility of correct judgement in making decisions.
Quite a lot of information is available on the neuronal centers and circuitries that differentially handle "need" and "pleasure/satisfaction" as motivational drives.

[owleye]

Actually, you are comparing our "memory" to perform almost automatic tasks and "memory" of having performed them, and the two have pretty different mechanisms and properties.

I'm not sure I agree with you, at least with respect to the examples I gave. When I say I'm in need of something (say dog food), it's because I'm the assigned person responsible (in this case for the daily feeding of our dog) and have to keep tabs on how much we have readily available so that I don't run out. This could be butter or other item which we make use of daily but don't need to purchase every time we go to the store. It does not happen on auto-pilot, so to speak. Similarly, satisfying the need isn't something that occurs automatically. We put it on our list to make sure we pick up a bag for example.

The problem is that although we can sometimes remember to pick up a bag, after having picked it up we may go for awhile before the need reasserts itself and the memory of having picked it up aren't synchronized. That is, when at some later time while in the store, something may be telling us of the need to pick up dog food and we try to figure out whether we actually already did. The memory of it has not faded in the sense that we don't remember picking it up ever, but we can't be sure that that memory was based on having satisfied the current need. (Which is to say that satisfying a need doesn't entirely remove it -- it retains a measure of currency. There is something missing in the connection between these two aspects of memory. Perhaps it is because of the responsibility we have of taking care of (in this case) the dog, that we go ahead and make that second purchase. (A similar thing, I believe occurs on the door locking. It isn't that there is anything automatic about it on either side of the equation. It's because we just can't make a strong connection between our obligation to do something and our having done it -- and so we can get out of sync.

On the other hand, the point you raise about need and satisfaction is of paramount interest. I do not think this is particularly relevant with respect to memory, but "need" and "satisfaction" play very different roles in our gratificatinal balance and in motivational control of behavior, mostly in terms of urgency versus possibility of postponing, pleasure of prefiguring and looking forward to, sublimation and correct decisional behavior.

Good points, I think, though I was assuming that memory is not only connected with general information about something or other, but has emotional content. I also don't think there is much in the way of time-stamping of the information -- rather it is probably mainly associative, and largely a reconstruction (well maybe not largely -- it seems so in me, though).

This is a problem made particularly acute by stress (which creates a situation of malaise and urgency, so that one needs some kind of gratification right away, whatever it be) and sustains bulimia (both the feeding disturbance and the general "bulimia" for consumables, goods, entertainment that characterizes our society) as a "need" for something which should instead be a "desire" (a desirable pleasure). Mostly, this is the insoluble problem with any form of addiction; in fact addiction ensues when the drug (or smoke, gambling, or whatever else) is no more looked for because it gives pleasure, but because one needs it, which dismantels the possibility of correct judgement in making decisions.
Quite a lot of information is available on the neuronal centers and circuitries that differentially handle "need" and "pleasure/satisfaction" as motivational drives.

All these are good points, though I was using 'need' not in any physiological sense, but rather in terms of fulfilling one's responsibility. This, of course, can be analyzed further in accordance with a particular balance of desire and fear, and undoubtedly this would be how our brain might motivate us, but there is something about a kind of 'in-between' state, useful in thinking of us a rational creatures who have a sense of doing the right thing which such an analysis would seem to miss.

James

[neuro]

I was using 'need' not in any physiological sense, but rather in terms of fulfilling one's responsibility. This, of course, can be analyzed further in accordance with a particular balance of desire and fear, and undoubtedly this would be how our brain might motivate us, but there is something about a kind of 'in-between' state, useful in thinking of us a rational creatures who have a sense of doing the right thing which such an analysis would seem to miss.

What if the "sense of doing the right thing" were able to activate reward pathways in the brain thereby producing a form of "desirable" pleasure?
Which, BTW, appears to be the case...

[owleye]

I was using 'need' not in any physiological sense, but rather in terms of fulfilling one's responsibility. This, of course, can be analyzed further in accordance with a particular balance of desire and fear, and undoubtedly this would be how our brain might motivate us, but there is something about a kind of 'in-between' state, useful in thinking of us a rational creatures who have a sense of doing the right thing which such an analysis would seem to miss.

What if the "sense of doing the right thing" were able to activate reward pathways in the brain thereby producing a form of "desirable" pleasure?
Which, BTW, appears to be the case...

I'm sure this is the case. Desire (or the desire to avoid -- i.e., fear), or the emotion that is identified with it, is undoubtedly involved in all actions. In fact absent such desire or emotion, we probably wouldn't be able to act. (If I'm not mistaken, there is evidence of this based on certain kinds of brain damage that sever the ties between the emotional area and our intellectual area of our brain. This is what D'Amasio pointed out in his book: Descartes' Error.) My point was that we also believe we can to some degree control the emotional area and make decisions to act that have at least a measure of rational control over it. If every action is seen through the lens of desire and fear, or emotion, we may miss the influence of what some count as our most important attribute.

James

[1900]

Greetings, everybody.

Facts :
-We can remember scenes of our lives that represent a gigantic amount of data.
-There is no particular data storage devices in the human brain.


This may be because what we call memory is just an attitude and radically differs from the memory disk of our computer. When we remember, our body puts arguably itself in an physiological attitude that renews the images of the past. It acts just like a black coffee drop that would find its way back through the percolation process and feel again transparency.

I know I am a bit late and the discussion has taken certain direction, and thus I am afraid my comments will not seem relevant enough, but I'll give it a try.
It seems to me that the OP considers the problem in a dichotomy:

1. Either (human) memory is space disk or it is an attitude.
2. It is not space disk.
C. Thus, it is an attitude.

One could say such argument, though valid, is a fallacy (a false dichotomy), because one could say, for instance: well, either memory is space disk or it is a dynamic net of a small world, and the conclusion would be: the memory is such a net. Why? Simply because memory is not space disk, at least as understood as a common HDD. However, such judging seems rather easy. Before that we should note the following:

A. To say that memory is not space disk because there is no particular data storage devices in the human brain does not seem quite right because i) there are certainly locations in the brain structure in which patterns are stored and because ii) there is a missing distinction: the location of memory is different from exercising memory. Exercising memory seems indeed like an attitude, a propositional attitude, for instance, "I "remember" that P", but such proposition is not the location or the structure of memory.

B. Following the OP's analogy, consider the relation between a computational program and the location of such program in the storage device. In terms of computer programs, we distinguish between the program-script and the program-process. The program-script is a set of well formed formulas of a language with Turing-completness, while the program-process is indeed that, an execution of some instructions. Thus, we cannot say both, the program and the location of it, are the same. In the same way, we cannot say the location of memory is equal to exercising the memory, but that does not mean that human memory IS an attitude.

C. Indeed, if memory is just an attitude then it radically differs from the memory disk of our computer, not because of the arguments of the OP, but because it is simply so! The Bourbaki school of mathematics would say, in terms of set theory: the hat is not equal to the box containing the hat!

So, all in all, the problem is that the OP:

I. Does not distinguish in a clear way between the use of "memory" as a structure and as an exercise, it jumps from the structure (the location) to the exercise of memory (attitude). And so, it does not follow that memory is an attitude (I am not saying such conclusion is false).
II. There is no real problem in the OP, because the OP talks about two different things: the hat is not equal to the box containing the hat!

Well, those are my two cents.

[neuro]

So, all in all, the problem is that the OP:

I. Does not distinguish in a clear way between the use of "memory" as a structure and as an exercise, it jumps from the structure (the location) to the exercise of memory (attitude). And so, it does not follow that memory is an attitude (I am not saying such conclusion is false).
II. There is no real problem in the OP, because the OP talks about two different things: the hat is not equal to the box containing the hat!

Well, all you say is surely consistent, but why don't we try to be a little more sympathetic to the OP, and read it as:
"the use our brain makes of its information storage capability is not similar to the use a computer makes of its disk space" ?
Which, in essence, I think is correct, because of neuronal intentionality in processing and because the brain "stores" patterns of activity rather than the objects they point to (note that this is not a coding, like numbers to bits: the system is redundant, imprecise, nonlinear, the "translation" itself is time-varying).
I would even improperly say that this way of processing and storing information, and the corresponding process of retrieval, both resemble more an "attitude" - ;°) - than coding-decoding processes.

All this without objecting to the stringent logic of your comments.

[neuro]

My point was that we also believe we can to some degree control the emotional area and make decisions to act that have at least a measure of rational control over it. If every action is seen through the lens of desire and fear, or emotion, we may miss the influence of what some count as our most important attribute.

You are certainly right.
Actually, I would reverse the perspective: our emotional and gratificational circuits are not only able to "reward" or "punish" our behaviors based on their result. They are also able to signal the rewarding/punishing "value" of imagined behaviors (think of the pleasure in prefiguring your meeting a person you mlove). And once practical as well as affective, social, aesthetic (I would add ethical) and intellectual aspects of possible behaviors have been so "evaluated" (translated into a rewarding/punishing "value"), then our cognitive, rational control is the one in charge of making choices, developing strategies, and guiding behavior.
All this, provided that reflex (very rapid), instinctive (quite rapid) and learned automatic responses (quite rapid too) have been inhibited by higher centers (count 1 to 7 before reacting... ;°)

[1900]

Greetings, neuro.

Well, all you say is surely consistent, but why don't we try to be a little more sympathetic to the OP, and read it as:
"the use our brain makes of its information storage capability is not similar to the use a computer makes of its disk space" ?
Which, in essence, I think is correct, because of neuronal intentionality in processing and because the brain "stores" patterns of activity rather than the objects they point to (note that this is not a coding, like numbers to bits: the system is redundant, imprecise, nonlinear, the "translation" itself is time-varying).
I would even improperly say that this way of processing and storing information, and the corresponding process of retrieval, both resemble more an "attitude" - ;°) - than coding-decoding processes.

All this without objecting to the stringent logic of your comments.

Agreed.

[Tea]

Which, in essence, I think is correct, because of neuronal intentionality in processing and because the brain "stores" patterns of activity rather than the objects they point to (note that this is not a coding, like numbers to bits: the system is redundant, imprecise, nonlinear, the "translation" itself is time-varying).

What is "neuronal intentionality" please?

[neuro]

What is "neuronal intentionality" please?

I am sorry, I confused this with another thread where we were talking about intentionality.
I use "intentional" in its phenomenological meaning: an act of consciousness is said to be "intentional" because it is directed, oriented (in-tended) toward an object: there cannot exist consciousness without an object, but only consciousness OF something.
I say neuronal activity is intentional because incoming data are processed by the nervous system in such a way that a neuron firing signals the presence of a certain pattern in the data, i.e. a feature, a relation, a scheme, an "object" in the incoming info. In this sense the activity of neurons is intrinsically "intentional" and is preserved in storing-retrieving information, whereas no such feature is present in computers, which save and retrieve the data themselves

[Tea]

What is "neuronal intentionality" please?

I am sorry, I confused this with another thread where we were talking about intentionality.
I use "intentional" in its phenomenological meaning: an act of consciousness is said to be "intentional" because it is directed, oriented (in-tended) toward an object: there cannot exist consciousness without an object, but only consciousness OF something.
I say neuronal activity is intentional because incoming data are processed by the nervous system in such a way that a neuron firing signals the presence of a certain pattern in the data, i.e. a feature, a relation, a scheme, an "object" in the incoming info. In this sense the activity of neurons is intrinsically "intentional" and is preserved in storing-retrieving information, whereas no such feature is present in computers, which save and retrieve the data themselves

Hi Neuro,

I'm still not very clear. Are you saying you are using "intentionality" in two different ways? Or are you saying that neuronal activity is itself an "act of consciousness"?

[neuro]

I'm still not very clear. Are you saying you are using "intentionality" in two different ways? Or are you saying that neuronal activity is itself an "act of consciousness"?

To define neuronal activity as an "act of consciousness" would be rather wierd, although thinking of it as a "quantum" of consciousness might be a nice way to approach a productive perspective on consciousness...
Anyway, no, I am just saying that, if "intentionality" is defined (forgetting its common use to indicate "related to will") as the property of being intrinsically directed, oriented toward an object, then neuronal activity has this property. Computer computation (oops!) process does not.

[Tea]

I'm still not very clear. Are you saying you are using "intentionality" in two different ways? Or are you saying that neuronal activity is itself an "act of consciousness"?

To define neuronal activity as an "act of consciousness" would be rather weird, although thinking of it as a "quantum" of consciousness might be a nice way to approach a productive perspective on consciousness...

I can't see how that would be productive of anything. Neuronal activity isn't consciousness, it's the cause of consciousness.

Anyway, no, I am just saying that, if "intentionality" is defined (forgetting its common use to indicate "related to will") as the property of being intrinsically directed, oriented toward an object, then neuronal activity has this property.

No it doesn't. It's undirected. Neuronal activity may be linked to an object, the light reflected from an object enters the eye and results in neuronal activity, but there is no directedness of the kind that characterises intentionality. Intentionality, direction, orientation, is an action carried out by a conscious agent, it's something that takes place at a completely different level to that of the neuron.

[owleye]

I can't see how that would be productive of anything. Neuronal activity isn't consciousness, it's the cause of consciousness.
...
No it doesn't. It's undirected. Neuronal activity may be linked to an object, the light reflected from an object enters the eye and results in neuronal activity, but there is no directedness of the kind that characterises intentionality. Intentionality, direction, orientation, is an action carried out by a conscious agent, it's something that takes place at a completely different level to that of the neuron.

The view you seem to be espousing here is suspiciously dualist -- i.e., that consciousness is something other than some particular brain activity, something external to the brain -- perhaps of a different kind of stuff.

Note that neuronal activity causing consciousness doesn't preclude consciousness being some other neuronal activity. Moreover, neuro's use of intentionality is not different than something that serves a function. Technological gadgets serve a function -- thus can be said to be intentional -- the difference is that the function is the result of human invention and so is useful to (i.e., directed toward) us -- not the product of natural selection, making it useful to the organism.

Notwithstanding, I believe neuro, like myself, wishes to figure out a way for certain brain activity to constitute consciousness. If I've understood his viewpoint it is centered on what he observes as the directedness of the neural network toward whatever intentionality consciousness consists in -- thinking, perceiving, acting, feeling, despite that this still leaves unattended other aspects, notably subjective, that remain unanswered.

I think your view that intentionality within consciousness is of a different sort than how we would describe neuronal activity has merit, but it may be that it falls out merely from how it happens to be created. As indicated by the difference between man-made gadgets and species evolved by way of natural selection, the essential difference is that in consciousness, the relationship is one of A serving itself, whereas in gadgetry, A serves something else. (The French philosopher Jean Baudrillard addresses this issue better than I ever could.) Your view would cast neuronal activity in the latter category, believing that neuronal activity represents a causal agency only. However, in neuro's view (I think), consciousness shows up in the way certain neuronal activity becomes the experience we have of ourselves in the context of what it is we are experiencing. It is (or amounts to) an overall mimicry of the brain taking charge of the organism and essentially becoming it, in the way it represents this to us in the form our experience takes.

James

[neuro]

hi, owleye!
you are perfectly right in my adding much of my own speculation and terminology to accepted neurology.

However, may I ask you a question about a thought experiment?
(assume you said YES, please...)

Imagine we stick an electrode in a neuron in the occipito-temporal cortex of a guy while he is undergoing open-skull surgery and ask him to focus his eyes on the center of a screen.
Imagine we record some irregular, scarce activity in the neuron, which indicates it receives some input.
Then imagine we project a circle on the screen and nothing happens. We project a square and nothing happens. We project a diagonal line on the screen, say at 45°, and nothing appreciable occurs, except maybe a slight increase in firing. Then we move around the line and again nothing happens.
Then imagine we rotate the line, say to 60°, and the neuron suddenly starts to fire intensely, and continues firing as we move the line on the screen provided we keep it reasonably close to the center of the screen.

Ok, you can stop imagining.
If that really occurred, would you be very opposed to my stating that the activity of that neuron is "intentional" in much the same sense the word is used by Husserl?

[Tea]

The view you seem to be espousing here is suspiciously dualist -- i.e., that consciousness is something other than some particular brain activity, something external to the brain -- perhaps of a different kind of stuff.

I could say that the view you are espousing is suspiciously materialist. I think thinking in "isms" can lead to unfortunate results.

Note that neuronal activity causing consciousness doesn't preclude consciousness being some other neuronal activity.

I don't understand what that would be like, consciousness "being" neuronal activity, in addition to being caused by neuronal activity. Suppose the cause is the neuronal activity "Z waves". When you induce Z waves, the subject brain becomes conscious. How could you then go on to say "and consciousness is this other activity, P waves". Why is P waves consciousness?

Moreover, neuro's use of intentionality is not different than something that serves a function.

I'm not sure I understand you, but I would say a function is an ascribed description, it's not an intrinsic property. Intentionality is a state of mind. The heart doesn't have the "function" of pumping the blood, that is just what happens. The sun doesn't have the "function" of providing energy for life, that is just what happens.

Notwithstanding, I believe neuro, like myself, wishes to figure out a way for certain brain activity to constitute consciousness. If I've understood his viewpoint it is centered on what he observes as the directedness of the neural network toward whatever intentionality consciousness consists in -- thinking, perceiving, acting, feeling, despite that this still leaves unattended other aspects, notably subjective, that remain unanswered.

In that case he hasn't said anything about how this activity constitutes consciousness. Thinking, perceiving, acting, feeling, are subjective.

I think your view that intentionality within consciousness is of a different sort than how we would describe neuronal activity has merit, but it may be that it falls out merely from how it happens to be created. As indicated by the difference between man-made gadgets and species evolved by way of natural selection, the essential difference is that in consciousness, the relationship is one of A serving itself, whereas in gadgetry, A serves something else.

Where consciousness is concerned, the essential difference is surely that a gadget isn't conscious? In consciousness, there is a self, but in gadgetry there isn't even a gadget until a consciousness says so.

Your view would cast neuronal activity in the latter category, believing that neuronal activity represents a causal agency only. However, in neuro's view (I think), consciousness shows up in the way certain neuronal activity becomes the experience we have of ourselves in the context of what it is we are experiencing. It is (or amounts to) an overall mimicry of the brain taking charge of the organism and essentially becoming it, in the way it represents this to us in the form our experience takes.

James

Thanks James. That seems to boil down to "experience is physical", without any explanation how it can be. So back to my Z waves and P waves.

[owleye]

I could say that the view you are espousing is suspiciously materialist. I think thinking in "isms" can lead to unfortunate results.

I think the ism I prefer in discussions such as this is physicalism. I don't mind admitting this. Dualism does have its adherents, so I wasn't trying to make it sound like a bad thing, but seeing as you your dismissal of neuro's points were so strongly worded, my sense was that you had certain beliefs that bore on the question. I would concede that taking a position doesn't require believing in it and in a discussion like this we can dismiss the 'isms' of the world and merely deal with it critically without having them interfere. However, in doing so, it seems more useful to provide reasons for the critique that are based on some or another position whether or not anyone actually believes it. My assessments of philosophers in dealing with the so-called mind-body problem, when they've come around to arguing for something, that they do so in the context of the history of philosophical development that includes the 'isms' you cast aspersions about. Which is to say that they often weigh in on one side or another, possibly altering what came before in accord with something they've identified which overcomes some problematic aspects of it. As such it at least requires them to understand the isms they deal with and the various criticisms that have been offered. In that sense I can't say as I have accomplished anywhere close to that capability, but I do recognize that a simple search of wikipedia, stanford, or even google can help in keeping me close to the front lines.

I don't understand what that would be like, consciousness "being" neuronal activity, in addition to being caused by neuronal activity. Suppose the cause is the neuronal activity "Z waves". When you induce Z waves, the subject brain becomes conscious. How could you then go on to say "and consciousness is this other activity, P waves". Why is P waves consciousness?

I don't know, principally because I don't know what consciousness is. The feature you were objecting to (its intentionality) might be mimicked by the neural network, and might even be the consequence of that mimicry. This, however, doesn't mean that consciousness has been uncovered. As I think Chalmers (or one of his contemporaries) says, this would be the easy part of the consciousness problem. The hard problem would still remain unresolved.

I'm not sure I understand you, but I would say a function is an ascribed description, it's not an intrinsic property. Intentionality is a state of mind. The heart doesn't have the "function" of pumping the blood, that is just what happens. The sun doesn't have the "function" of providing energy for life, that is just what happens.

Well, the sort of 'function' I had in mind is based on usefulness. The heart pumping blood is useful to the organism -- it serves a purpose. Perhaps the heart doesn't know its use, and so when viewing the heart one merely describes what it is doing. The function it serves wouldn't on that view be intrinsic to what it was doing. One has to think of it within a larger system, and in particular one that can be described as a control system, which exposes a dynamic quality to it, which when its parts are functional, exists so long as it remains in some dynamic equilibrium. Removing the heart from the organism has two effects (1) the heart will no longer be functional because it will no longer be useful to the organism, and (2) because it is a vital organ, will cause the control system to fail, which in turn will cause the organism (as a system) to cease to exist. The brain is a vital organism as well, and its removal would have the same consequences. However, the brain (or perhaps better, the nervous system, is useful not just to the organism, but might also be considered as representing the organism in its own right. (Let me accept that it couldn't represent the entire organism, and so can't overcome that it is still a part, not the whole, but I think in its design it does reach into almost every part and plays a management role by its extension, one which makes it close to being the intrinsically self-governing whole organism.)

Where consciousness is concerned, the essential difference is surely that a gadget isn't conscious? In consciousness, there is a self, but in gadgetry there isn't even a gadget until a consciousness says so.

[/quote]

Well, I think you're right about this, but your knowing this seems to depend on what you think consciousness would exclude. Gadgets, I gather, couldn't possess consciousness because (presumably) it would have to say there are gadgets.

Intentionality, according to you, is apparently its defining feature. My understanding of this concept is that it means that mental activity is directed or that it is about something. To think is to think about something. To feel is to feel something (though this by some is considered problematically intentional because presumably it is not directed and not about something, and in some cases, like the feeling of pleasure, anxiety and the like are not directed toward something else. However, I think this can be overcome by having such feelings remain directed and about something if one includes one's self as the target.)

However, in my mind, this feature is not dissimilar to how the brain functions to serve the organism. The activity that has a self-aboutness respecting its content shows a parallel with self and its object to the brain acting as the organism in its activity directed toward the control of some part of the environment it connects with. Perceiving, in particular, reaches beyond itself in order for the brain to be able to deal with it. It isn't just information received about the object, the brain seems to act as if it is in need of a representation of that object in order to adequately deal with what is received. Perceiving gives it that capability, in the form consciousness provides it.

James

[Tea]

I don't understand what that would be like, consciousness "being" neuronal activity, in addition to being caused by neuronal activity. Suppose the cause is the neuronal activity "Z waves". When you induce Z waves, the subject brain becomes conscious. How could you then go on to say "and consciousness is this other activity, P waves". Why is P waves consciousness?

I don't know, principally because I don't know what consciousness is.

I think you do know what it is, you can't help knowing what it is, but you don't know what causes it.

Perhaps you mean that you won't know what consciousness is until it has been reduced to the physical? Because your physicalism requires that? But what if it can't be? That's what I'm getting at. I understand how you can say "that physical process causes consciousness" I don't understand how you can say "that physical process is consciousness".

Well, the sort of 'function' I had in mind is based on usefulness. The heart pumping blood is useful to the organism -- it serves a purpose. Perhaps the heart doesn't know its use, and so when viewing the heart one merely describes what it is doing. The function it serves wouldn't on that view be intrinsic to what it was doing. One has to think of it within a larger system, and in particular one that can be described as a control system, which exposes a dynamic quality to it, which when its parts are functional, exists so long as it remains in some dynamic equilibrium.

My point is that none of these things (functions, usefulness, purpose, systems) have an existence independent of a conscious observer who identifies and defines them.

Well, I think you're right about this, but your knowing this seems to depend on what you think consciousness would exclude. Gadgets, I gather, couldn't possess consciousness because (presumably) it would have to say there are gadgets.

A particular type of "gadget" could possess consciousness, if we knew what causes consciousness and could make a gadget that could do this. But neuro's gadgets don't even attempt to replicate the cause of consciousness. They attempt to replicate some of its external effects. I think.

Intentionality, according to you, is apparently its defining feature.

No, I agree with Husserl that there can be consciousness without intentionality. He gives the example of pain.

However, in my mind, this feature is not dissimilar to how the brain functions to serve the organism. The activity that has a self-aboutness respecting its content shows a parallel with self and its object to the brain acting as the organism in its activity directed toward the control of some part of the environment it connects with. Perceiving, in particular, reaches beyond itself in order for the brain to be able to deal with it. It isn't just information received about the object, the brain seems to act as if it is in need of a representation of that object in order to adequately deal with what is received. Perceiving gives it that capability, in the form consciousness provides it.

I don't understand what you are getting at here. Maybe it isn't relevant, if you accept that intentionality is not essential to consciousness. Perhaps we can come back to it if necessary.

Thanks for the discussion, I'm enjoying it.

[owleye]

I think you do know what it is, you can't help knowing what it is, but you don't know what causes it.

Perhaps you mean that you won't know what consciousness is until it has been reduced to the physical? Because your physicalism requires that? But what if it can't be? That's what I'm getting at. I understand how you can say "that physical process causes consciousness" I don't understand how you can say "that physical process is consciousness".

If consciousness cannot be reduced to the physical, then I would reject physicalism. However, by such reduction I wouldn't want to imply that there can't be emergent properties, of which consciousness would be one. If consciousness exists at all (and at times I wonder about this), then if consciousness is not physical then we have a problem in how physical processes can cause it. This is a problem I would prefer to avoid. My thinking is that consciousness evolved in accordance with Darwinian evolution, and has a long history, much longer than humans have been around, though in its earlier forms doesn't have all the faculties humans are familiar with.

My point is that none of these things (functions, usefulness, purpose, systems) have an existence independent of a conscious observer who identifies and defines them.

I think this is reaching. When we describe certain biological features of plants we document them not just taxonomically, we strive to understand them in the context of how they serve the organism in which they are a part. Why do we do this? Because we cannot understand biological processes unless they are seen through the lens of a functional analysis, especially in the light of evolutionary theory. The leaf (and the chemical processes involved that turn light energy into useful energy to the plant) is not accidental to the plant. It is not a mere appendage. Its vessels, its very design, if you like, serves the plant's survival and reproductive capacity, exactly in accordance with the demands of evolution by natural selection as understood within its genetic constitution. This is considered a discovery, not an invention, as humans eventually got around to understanding the nature of living organisms.

To avoid confusion, let me acknowledge that functions are emergent and exist only to the extent they are needed, and so there's nothing particularly sacred about their existence insofar as their biology is concerned. Environmental changes that affect a population can and do affect the organism's capacities for survival and reproductive success, and mechanisms that are currently dormant (not or weakly influencing) can be converted into functional entities causing a new layer of adaptation to be infused into its genetic history -- birds can emerge from dinosaurs.

A particular type of "gadget" could possess consciousness, if we knew what causes consciousness and could make a gadget that could do this. But neuro's gadgets don't even attempt to replicate the cause of consciousness. They attempt to replicate some of its external effects. I think.

Well, neurologists have a fairly good understanding of what in a general sense induces consciousness -- anesthesiologists exist on that premise. What you seem to be looking for is something that connects with a consciousness that isn't physical, which is a problem physicalists don't have. Physicalists have different problems to overcome.

James

[Tea]

If consciousness cannot be reduced to the physical, then I would reject physicalism. However, by such reduction I wouldn't want to imply that there can't be emergent properties, of which consciousness would be one. If consciousness exists at all (and at times I wonder about this),

Hi James,

What do you wonder with? Who is the "I" who wonders? Wondering is an act of consciousness, how can you use consciousness to wonder if consciousness exists? Your consciousness is the only thing that exists, for you.

then if consciousness is not physical then we have a problem in how physical processes can cause it. This is a problem I would prefer to avoid.

But if consciousness can't be reduced to the physical you can't avoid the problem. And I can't see how you can reduce consciousness to the physical, the way we currently understand physics. Saying "consciousness is this particle or that wave pattern" won't do, those things will still be just the cause of consciousness, not consciousness itself.

My thinking is that consciousness evolved in accordance with Darwinian evolution, and has a long history, much longer than humans have been around, though in its earlier forms doesn't have all the faculties humans are familiar with.

Yes, but what is the relevance of that? I'm not a creationist or a religionist if that's what you are thinking.

My point is that none of these things (functions, usefulness, purpose, systems) have an existence independent of a conscious observer who identifies and defines them.

I think this is reaching. When we describe certain biological features of plants we document them not just taxonomically, we strive to understand them in the context of how they serve the organism in which they are a part. Why do we do this? Because we cannot understand biological processes unless they are seen through the lens of a functional analysis, especially in the light of evolutionary theory. The leaf (and the chemical processes involved that turn light energy into useful energy to the plant) is not accidental to the plant. It is not a mere appendage. Its vessels, its very design, if you like, serves the plant's survival and reproductive capacity, exactly in accordance with the demands of evolution by natural selection as understood within its genetic constitution. This is considered a discovery, not an invention, as humans eventually got around to understanding the nature of living organisms.

You're talking about what we know, I'm talking about what there is.

The leaf of a plant doesn't exist as an entity except when so identified by an observer. Is the leaf stem part of the leaf? If so, what about where the stem runs up into the leaf? Where is the cut-off point? Is the water in the leaf part of the leaf? Is the air inside the leaf part of the leaf? When does a bud become a leaf?

The physical matter or the fields and forces that make up the leaf and the water and the plant exist independent of observers. But the parts we draw our lines around don't have a separate existence except in our minds. The same applies to the "analysis" and "theories" that you mention. The analysis doesn't have an existence independent of an analysing observer. The theory isn't the reality, it's a description of some aspect of reality, from the point of view of an observer. Similarly, evolution doesn't make any demands. It is just chance.

To avoid confusion, let me acknowledge that functions are emergent and exist only to the extent they are needed, and so there's nothing particularly sacred about their existence insofar as their biology is concerned.

So I am saying they only exist insofar as we need them, as ideas. Both the organs themselves and the functions we ascribe to them only exist as ideas. Where do the lungs stop and start? Is it the "function" of the lungs to become blackened from living in a smoky atmosphere?

Environmental changes that affect a population can and do affect the organism's capacities for survival and reproductive success, and mechanisms that are currently dormant (not or weakly influencing) can be converted into functional entities causing a new layer of adaptation to be infused into its genetic history -- birds can emerge from dinosaurs.

"Bird" and "dinosaur" might be interesting examples to demonstrate observer-dependent and observer-independent existence. I claim there are not two types of thing, on the one hand birds on the other hand dinosaurs. So there's no emergence. We simply categorise the more recent dinosaurs as birds.

Well, neurologists have a fairly good understanding of what in a general sense induces consciousness -- anesthesiologists exist on that premise.

No they don't! They don't know what induces consciousness, they only know what shuts it down. They can take away things that are shutting down an existing consciousness, but they can't induce a consciousness that isn't there in the first place.

What you seem to be looking for is something that connects with a consciousness that isn't physical, which is a problem physicalists don't have. Physicalists have different problems to overcome.

Obviously I think you do have a problem with consciousness.

[neuro]

Hi James,

What do you wonder with? Who is the "I" who wonders?

Are these two different questions?
What if the "one" were "what" one wonders with? i.e. a neural activity?

Wondering is an act of consciousness, how can you use consciousness to wonder if consciousness exists? Your consciousness is the only thing that exists, for you.

Why shoud one "use" his consciousness?
Why should not one wonder about consciousness?

My point is that none of these things (functions, usefulness, purpose, systems) have an existence independent of a conscious observer who identifies and defines them.

Why should then consciousness have an existence in itself?

The leaf of a plant doesn't exist as an entity except when so identified by an observer.

I imagine you are implying that consciousness instead does exist as an entity. Isn't it so?

The physical matter or the fields and forces that make up the leaf and the water and the plant exist independent of observers.

Thus is consciousness physical matter or a field or force, and are you who "use" it a matter or a field or force?

So I am saying they only exist insofar as we need them, as ideas.
Both the organs themselves and the functions we ascribe to them only exist as ideas.

But consciousness, instead, does exist on its own. Is that what you mean?

"Bird" and "dinosaur" might be interesting examples to demonstrate observer-dependent and observer-independent existence. I claim there are not two types of thing, on the one hand birds on the other hand dinosaurs. So there's no emergence. We simply categorise the more recent dinosaurs as birds.

Why then are you so hot about consciousness being a physical process or a property of a metaphysical entity like you? Isn't this a categorization problem as well?

Well, neurologists have a fairly good understanding of what in a general sense induces consciousness -- anesthesiologists exist on that premise.

No they don't! They don't know what induces consciousness, they only know what shuts it down. They can take away things that are shutting down an existing consciousness, but they can't induce a consciousness that isn't there in the first place.

Do you know that you can create two independent consciousness instead of one in a person by just sectioning her corpus callosus?

Obviously I think you do have a problem with consciousness.

This is not a particularly nice thing to say to anybody (especially to somebody who is arguing so seriously and patiently with you...).

[Tea]

Hi James,

What do you wonder with? Who is the "I" who wonders?

Are these two different questions?
What if the "one" were "what" one wonders with? i.e. a neural activity?

But it just isn't.

Wondering is an act of consciousness, how can you use consciousness to wonder if consciousness exists? Your consciousness is the only thing that exists, for you.

Why should one "use" his consciousness?
Why should not one wonder about consciousness?

I think you're misunderstanding my questions. I'm asking how it can be logically coherent to use consciousness to question whether consciousness exists.

My point is that none of these things (functions, usefulness, purpose, systems) have an existence independent of a conscious observer who identifies and defines them.

Why should then consciousness have an existence in itself?

Well, some things do. Some things have an observer-independent existence, and some things depend on an observer for their existence. Consciousness is in the former category.

Thus is consciousness physical matter or a field or force, and are you who "use" it a matter or a field or force?

My body can be reduced to matter or fields and forces, or whatever the nature of matter really is.

My mind can't.

Why then are you so hot about consciousness being a physical process or a property of a metaphysical entity like you? Isn't this a categorization problem as well?

What do you mean by "hot" here?

Do you know that you can create two independent consciousness instead of one in a person by just sectioning her corpus callosus?

That isn't creating a consciousness, it is modifying one that is already there.

Obviously I think you do have a problem with consciousness.

This is not a particularly nice thing to say to anybody (especially to somebody who is arguing so seriously and patiently with you...).

You're misreading the tone of what I said. I only meant James still has a philosophical problem with consciousness, it wasn't a personal remark, and certainly not a personal attack.

[neuro]

Tea,
the only purpose of my previous post was to try and point out that James has made a strong effort to try and precisely qualify what he means by "consciousness", and he admits that the picture is not fully clear to him; on the other hand, I offered my view on the question in other posts.
You instead appear to keep switching among several quite different definitions and ideas about the metaphysical, epistemological and functional status of the term.
When you say "you use consciousness", it appears to be a simple cognitive instrument.
Most of the time you just stress the self-evidence of consciousness.
When you equate it with "mind"

My body can be reduced to matter or fields and forces, or whatever the nature of matter really is.
My mind can't.

it seems you are referring to something which cannot be reduced to physiological processes, although most scientists and philosophers today actually use the term "mind" to refer to the set of mental functions which can be explained by how our neurons work, as opposed to spirit, soul, and other supernatural entities.
At times you seem to refer to the term meaning "intentionality", but that seems a little reductive.
Then you kind of paraphrase Descartes by substituting "consciousness" for "thought"

Your consciousness is the only thing that exists, for you

When you ask:

What do you wonder with? Who is the "I" who wonders?

it appears that consciousness be both one's instrument to wonder and the constitutive base of the "I" who wonders. Which is it?
And if I ask

What if the "one" were "what" one wonders with? i.e. a neural activity?

But it just isn't.

you appear pretty sure of your answer. But who told you that? what are the grounds on which you are so sure of this opinion of yours?

In general, it appears that you consider consciousness as something which cannot be explained in any way by mechanisms, matter, forces, or whatsoever can be scientifically studied. Then you claim "I'm not a creationist or a religionist". I do believe you, but what is YOUR standpoint then?

My point is:
You are arguing by playing on the semantic multiplicity, ambiguity and indefiniteness of the term "consciousness"; other people's statements can easily be transformed into trivial and unsubstantiated claims, by switching among different definitions, and you can win all arguments. But what's the use of this?

[Tea]

Tea,
the only purpose of my previous post was to try and point out that James has made a strong effort to try and precisely qualify what he means by "consciousness", and he admits that the picture is not fully clear to him; on the other hand, I offered my view on the question in other posts.
You instead appear to keep switching among several quite different definitions and ideas about the metaphysical, epistemological and functional status of the term.
When you say "you use consciousness", it appears to be a simple cognitive instrument.

I don't know what point you are trying to make there neuro. I don't see any problem with talking about different aspects of consciousness, as long as I'm not contradicting myself. But what is a "cognitive instrument"?

Most of the time you just stress the self-evidence of consciousness.

I don't "just" stress it. It is self-evident.

When you equate it with "mind" it seems you are referring to something which cannot be reduced to physiological processes, although most scientists and philosophers today actually use the term "mind" to refer to the set of mental functions which can be explained by how our neurons work, as opposed to spirit, soul, and other supernatural entities.

Ad populum:

"If you suggest too strongly that someone’s claim or argument is correct simply because it’s what most everyone believes, then you’ve committed the fallacy of appeal to the people. Similarly, if you suggest too strongly that someone’s claim or argument is mistaken simply because it’s not what most everyone believes, then you’ve also committed the fallacy. Agreement with popular opinion is not necessarily a reliable sign of truth, and deviation from popular opinion is not necessarily a reliable sign of error, but if you assume it is and do so with enthusiasm, then you’re guilty of committing this fallacy. It is also called mob appeal, appeal to the gallery, argument from popularity, and argumentum ad populum. The ‘too strongly’ is important in the description of the fallacy because what most everyone believes is, for that reason, somewhat likely to be true, all things considered. However, the fallacy occurs when this degree of support is overestimated."

Bandwagon:

"If you suggest that someone’s claim is correct simply because it’s what most everyone is coming to believe, then you’re committing the bandwagon fallacy. Get up here with us on the wagon where the band is playing, and go where we go, and don’t think too much about the reasons. The Latin term for this fallacy of appeal to novelty is Argumentum ad Novitatem."

Group Think:

A reasoner commits the group think fallacy if he or she substitutes pride of membership in the group for reasons to support the group’s policy. If that’s what our group thinks, then that’s good enough for me. It’s what I think, too.

Appeal to Consequence:

Arguing that a belief is false because it implies something you’d rather not believe. Also called Argumentum Ad Consequentiam.



~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1. I'm really not interested in discussing consciousness with somebody who denies that it exists.
2. I know a lot of scientists take a functionalist approach. In my experience, functionalists always take things too far.
3. Mental functions can't yet be explained by how our neurons work.

At times you seem to refer to the term meaning "intentionality", but that seems a little reductive.

Some aspects of consciousness are Intentional, others aren't.

it appears that consciousness is both one's instrument to wonder and the constitutive base of the "I" who wonders. Which is it?

Both.

What if the "one" were "what" one wonders with? i.e. a neural activity?

But it just isn't.

you appear pretty sure of your answer. But who told you that? what are the grounds on which you are so sure of this opinion of yours?

What you are saying is that the mental can be reduced to the physical. I don't believe that is true. I have various reasons: Nagel's "What is it like to be a bat?" or Jackson's "Mary's Room" illustrate the thought process involved.

In general, it appears that you consider consciousness as something which cannot be explained in any way by mechanisms, matter, forces, or whatsoever can be scientifically studied.

I have never said that. I do believe that consciousness can be explained and scientifically studied, but I don't believe functionalism or materialism can or will do this.

Then you claim "I'm not a creationist or a religionist". I do believe you, but what is YOUR standpoint then?

Undecided, tending towards Biological Naturalism. Materialism and dualism are false.