Oh, yes, they waffled! I was there, I'm not making it up. If we could access those discussions now you'd see it.
I can’t comment further on this, without seeing the discussions. Are they no longer online? You can’t link to them?
You're saying 'the universe' may mean several - or at least more than one - universes. Forgive me, I'm not creating this confusion! I mean, you must see the point and not just brush it off. From now on, whenever the term 'universe' is used I'm going to ask which one. Would that be fair?
It is indeed a terminological dispute, of no great consequence except, perhaps, to linguists.
There is an interpretation of quantum theory, a meta-theory, which holds that there is no state vector reduction, no so-called wavefunction collapse. It is popularly known as the Many Worlds interpretation of QM. Apply this to Schrödinger’s famous cat, and you obtain a version of reality in which an observer is quantum-entangled with a live cat, and his doppelgänger observer is quantum-entangled with a dead cat. Both are real. Are these now two different universes, or the same universe with two different versions of the cat and the observer, one cat dead, the other alive? Does it really matter? Again, if you wish to define “universe” as all that there is, anywhere, at any time, ever, then the Many Worlds are, indeed, different “worlds” within the same universe (all that there is, or ever could be). Alternatively, one may argue that because the live-cat, dead-cat “worlds” are now spatiotemporally disconnected, and cannot again interact in any way (as the Many Worlds meta-theory maintains), they are effectively two different “universes.” I say again, this is purely a terminological difference. It makes no difference to the science whether you say that the two different cats, one dead and the other alive, are in two different “universes,” or that they now occupy two different “worlds” within the same universe. Who cares?
Consider, for example, that there are many different locations in the universe, and many different moments. Are each of these different spatial and temporal locations just subsets of a singe universe? Or would you wish to define them each as an individual universe? You can do the latter if you wish, but it just makes no difference to empirical facts. It’s just a matter of how people prefer to employ language.
We know that locations in space and time are indexicals — basically, point-of-view dependent. Wherever I am, I call it “here.” Whenever I am, I call it “now.” There is a philosophical idea (not scientific!) originated by the late analytic philosopher David K. Lewis, which holds that actuality, like locations in time in space, is indexical. If true, this would mean that all counterfactuals are, in fact, actual — but only to their own observers. There is a “world,” according to Lewis, actual to its own inhabitants but not actual to us, in which pigs actually fly. There is another in which donkeys actually talk. There is another in which the ancient Greek gods are literally real. Basically, on this doctrine, everything that is logically possible, is actual. (There is no Lewisian world with four-sided triangles, for example, since that is not logically possible and hence cannot be actual.)
Now whether you think this is all hooey or not is beside the point. (Lewis said that whenever it sank in to people what he was saying, they invariably gave him “an incredulous stare.”)
The point is, Lewis specifies that these actualities are spatiotemporally isolated from one another, and cannot communicate even in principle — no different, really, from the QM Many Worlds idea. Are these, then, different universes, or different versions of one universe (all that there is, anywhere, anytime, or ever could be)? Why does it even matter? It’s purely a terminological dispute, a matter of how one wishes to define certain words.
The upshot is, there cannot both be one universe, and many universes, at the same time. If one wishes to define universe as all that there is, ever was, or ever could be, then it encompasses different regions — different regions in space and time, different actualities if Lewis is right, different quantum branches if Many Worlds is right, and etc. However, if one wishes to define these different regions as independent universes, then there is more than one universe.
I know, but that's all nonsense if 'universe' means an infinite, limitless totality. It can't be finite and infinite both. So which one are you talking about?
Right, it can’t be both infinite and finite — I never said that it could! If the universe is flat it is infinite, if it’s curved it’s finite (but unbounded). On or the other, not both!
It can only expand if it has a certain size or quality to begin with. Something can only get bigger when it's smaller first. But if it's infinite and limitless then the idea of expansion doesn't arise because it doesn't apply.
Yes, it does apply. Expansion means that cosmic distances — basically, distances between galaxies — increase over time. This can happen perfectly well whether the universe is spatially infinite or spatially finite but unbounded (curved). In the deep past, all objects in a spatially infinite universe could have been infinitely close together. The universe would still be spatially infinite.