![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
mitchellmckain » November 23rd, 2017, 12:30 am wrote:I certainly agree with all of this. Another problem I see is that the P entity is also poorly defined because while we can imagine perfection like an infinite limit on some one dimensional measure, there are far more than one aspect to any being. And if we are striving to describe something good we do not want to go to extremes in all attributes because for some things being good is a matter of having opposing tendencies in balance. Thus I would suggest there is not only a multiplicity of G but also a multiplicity of P, and not everyone is going to choose the same attributes which should be optimized (by some infinite limit) in a being they would respect and admire.
hyksos » November 22nd, 2017, 1:59 pm wrote:Are these above scenarios true on account of the fact that I can deductively show them as possible and logically plausible? Of course not. It is equally logical to claim that G=P. I don't see how deductive logic in isolation could resolve either scenario.
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
Hamlet wrote:There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.
Nelson Goodman wrote:I am concerned, rather, that there should not be more things dreamt of in my philosophy than there actually are in heaven and earth.
BadgerJelly » November 25th, 2017, 5:19 am wrote:The stars don't exist for ants because they simply don't conceptualise them, just like they don't think about how lovelyyour coffee table is when wandering over it. That is not to say the physical thingness of the table is not there, but it certainly means that the existence of the "table" is absent for the ants.
So "God" exists, and we could even suggest that physical evidence of "god" exists too, but then we'd be talking about a kind of concept of "god" you wouldn't be happy to call a "god".
BadgerJelly » November 23rd, 2017, 6:25 am wrote:If I was to say that a frog and a horse have four legs and eyes am I saying they are the same?
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
Lomax » November 27th, 2017, 2:57 pm wrote:mitchellmckain » November 23rd, 2017, 12:30 am wrote:I certainly agree with all of this. Another problem I see is that the P entity is also poorly defined because while we can imagine perfection like an infinite limit on some one dimensional measure, there are far more than one aspect to any being. And if we are striving to describe something good we do not want to go to extremes in all attributes because for some things being good is a matter of having opposing tendencies in balance. Thus I would suggest there is not only a multiplicity of G but also a multiplicity of P, and not everyone is going to choose the same attributes which should be optimized (by some infinite limit) in a being they would respect and admire.
I think we need only say that the perfect being is the one which maximises the sum total of these desirable traits, as much as possible. It's probably nothing the simplex method couldn't deal with.
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
Lomax » November 27th, 2017, 5:50 pm wrote:mitchellmckain » November 23rd, 2017, 12:30 am wrote:I certainly agree with all of this. Another problem I see is that the P entity is also poorly defined because while we can imagine perfection like an infinite limit on some one dimensional measure, there are far more than one aspect to any being. And if we are striving to describe something good we do not want to go to extremes in all attributes because for some things being good is a matter of having opposing tendencies in balance. Thus I would suggest there is not only a multiplicity of G but also a multiplicity of P, and not everyone is going to choose the same attributes which should be optimized (by some infinite limit) in a being they would respect and admire.And how does the simplex method deal with the fact that people will not even agree on the parameters of this optimization. The point was that when it comes to some things like life, worlds, and beings, things like what is good or perfect are somewhat subjective, and thus instead of a singular P we have a multiplicity. Of course there are always people ready to say that their subjective choices and judgments are objective and absolute, but the diversity of such opinions makes this rather unsupportable.
That was Hyksos's point. The passage by you, quoted by me, makes the point that there is more than one variable. That the simplex method can deal with. To make our opinions for us is, of course, too much to ask of it.
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
Lomax » November 27th, 2017, 6:40 pm wrote:No, I follow. But if the perfect being is the best possible being then it's the sum of all the values of the variables that matters. If the importance of each variable is weighted the yes, the simplex method can handle that.
Lomax » November 27th, 2017, 6:40 pm wrote:Whether we know ourselves whether to assign numerical values to our opinions is a bigger problem. But is it? It's not necessary that we agree on all the attributes of the perfect being in order to consider whether there must be a perfect being. Any more than we need to Know every town in Italy to know that it exists.
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
mitchellmckain » November 28th, 2017, 12:58 am wrote:Lomax » November 27th, 2017, 6:40 pm wrote:No, I follow. But if the perfect being is the best possible being then it's the sum of all the values of the variables that matters. If the importance of each variable is weighted the yes, the simplex method can handle that.
A best fit to all of the various opinions together is most likely just going to result in something that none of them will agree is "perfect." No I stick to my conclusion that there is a multiplicity of P.
mitchellmckain » November 28th, 2017, 12:58 am wrote:Lomax » November 27th, 2017, 6:40 pm wrote:Whether we know ourselves whether to assign numerical values to our opinions is a bigger problem. But is it? It's not necessary that we agree on all the attributes of the perfect being in order to consider whether there must be a perfect being. Any more than we need to Know every town in Italy to know that it exists.
Well it was already Braininvat's argument (as well as mine) that this argument is over productive of perfect beings (by example of the unicorn). With a multiple of P then the result is that gods exist not a singular God, right?
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
I'm pleasantly to find this thread is still interesting after five full pages, although if it's a general debate about theism and religion now, we can expect fifty more.
I do not understand how your second paragraph follows from your first. That the stars do not exist for ants is true. That the stars exist regardless of whether they exist for the ants is also true. It does not follow that everything which does not exist for the ants must exist nonetheless. If it did, you better make room for many more gods than just the one. And they won't be comfortable sharing the space with each other.
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
BadgerJelly » November 27th, 2017, 11:50 pm wrote: Not a single person can disagree with what I say above if they understand it.
BadgerJelly » November 27th, 2017, 11:50 pm wrote:For if we are talking about "non-existence" what is it we claim to be talking about?
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
I can only believe that is true if you are not actually saying anything. But perhaps you underestimate the diversity of human thought, assuming you are not willfully blinding yourself to it.
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
BadgerJelly » November 28th, 2017, 5:50 am wrote:I am not sure why you are bringing "gods" into this?
BadgerJelly » November 28th, 2017, 5:50 am wrote:Here is what I imagine you'd refer to as a "hypomanic ramble"
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
|
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
To the whole issue of ontology and existence, it is like you're trying to forget that ontology is not about defining something physical as existing and something non-physical as not existing. To say such a thing is to say you know positive noumenon (to hark back to Kant.) The point of ontology is to attempt to distinguish the differences between "entities", and these "entities" exist in some manner.
I would say that if I can think of something then I can bring about its physical manifestation in way or another, and what is more I MUST do this by my ability to do so.
I don't mean I can physically conjure up some dragon or something. I just mean that I require the ability to physically attach some idea to matter in order for me to think of it is the first place. Not only this, I MUST render it physically in some fashion for it to be known or it cannot be known.
I am a phenomenologist (for want of a better term), so when you make comments about subject and object I just find it closed minded and deeply misguided when you assume I am insinuating some kind of magical land of make believe.
Objects are objects. Imagined or material they are not separate or you're just carrying on the age old tradition of dualism in its scientific guise.
note: I am just trying to give you as best an argument as I can. Much of what I am saying here I do hold to though and I am saying it because I get tired of seeing very immobile refutations about religion and such things that involve some very strange.
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
BadgerJelly » November 29th, 2017, 10:58 am wrote:Accusation? I guess so. I thought it was clear enough that I was not saying accusing you of being a physicalist.
BadgerJelly » November 29th, 2017, 10:58 am wrote:I didn't write four paragraphs above that were a "mental health assessment". I presented words I wrote years ago and made clear they were from a particular mental state, and then tried to explain why I felt they were significant here. You then decided to take those words and make them partly offensive to yourself and then turn them back on me. I don't believe I said "schitzophrenia" anywhere here? Maybe I did, but I can't see where? If I did there would have been a point.
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
Lomax » November 29th, 2017, 6:42 pm wrote:The invitation certainly was my intention. It seems to have been declined.
Lomax » November 29th, 2017, 6:42 pm wrote:I don't agree with your argument that you must "render it physically in some fashion for it to be known or it cannot be known." There are many ways an empiricist can argue for non-physical existence - take the indispensability argument for example.
Lomax » November 29th, 2017, 6:42 pm wrote:What Neri and I propose is that the argument is poor logic regardless of its notion of existence. To say that anything you can imagine thereby exists is a different (Parminidean) argument altogether, and doesn't put the perfect being on any special footing.
Lomax » November 29th, 2017, 6:42 pm wrote:For what it's worth I think one need not be a mind-body dualist in order to say that unreal things can be imagined.
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
I think I also see an inconsistency in your assumptions: you say against my supposed attempt to "forget" that ontology is different from physicalism that "to say such a thing is to say you know positive noumenon (to hark back to Kant.)" Elsewhere you say "objects are objects. Imagined or material they are not separate or you're just carrying on the age old tradition of dualism in its scientific guise." You'll tell me if it's unfair of me to take this as a criticism of such dualism. But how does this dualism differ from your tacit claim that noumena are different to phenomena? It seems to me essentially the same idea - that the stuff in your mind is different in its metaphysical form to the stuff outside of it.
The invitation certainly was my intention. It seems to have been declined.
For what it's worth I think one need not be a mind-body dualist in order to say that unreal things can be imagined
The argument is called the Ontological Argument because he is arguing that something exists; not because he is exploring the question of what existence is.
What Neri and I propose is that the argument is poor logic regardless of its notion of existence. To say that anything you can imagine thereby exists is a different (Parminidean) argument altogether, and doesn't put the perfect being on any special footing.
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
mitchellmckain » November 30th, 2017, 4:06 am wrote:Lomax » November 29th, 2017, 6:42 pm wrote:The invitation certainly was my intention. It seems to have been declined.
I saw an invitation to comment and I did so, but you seem to see things on some abstract plane - an invitation not elaborated upon in the words written... or an accusation using a definition of physicalism I have never heard of before. Without explication, I suppose the only way to respond to this request is to comment more and either hit or miss and possibly get more clues as to what you want me to comment on.
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
BadgerJelly » November 30th, 2017, 6:46 am wrote:The invitation certainly was my intention. It seems to have been declined.
Not declined, just postponed. If your question was simply "What did you mean?" then I can make some attempts to explain further (it does not end in any particular conclusion though, just a number of questions and different ideas of attack toward the problems unearthed.)
BadgerJelly » November 30th, 2017, 6:46 am wrote:note: I have done my best to be clear.
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
Quantities are the convenience of the human condition (or rather they are the human condition), all we "know" we know about we know about, in our "aboutness", in an emotional context (human context). The physical is taken on as apodictic in an objective manner and it functions well enough for method to arise and science to stand above subjectivity even though it is itself merely a bracketing of subjective being, not in anyway a holding of noumenon in a positive sense, but set up in such a manner as to appear to be positive noumenon and to make an equivalence between "positive noumenon" and "physical reality"
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
Quantities are the convenience of the human condition (or rather they are the human condition), all we "know" we know about we know about, in our "aboutness", in an emotional context (human context). The physical is taken on as apodictic in an objective manner and it functions well enough for method to arise and science to stand above subjectivity even though it is itself merely a bracketing of subjective being, not in anyway a holding of noumenon in a positive sense, but set up in such a manner as to appear to be positive noumenon and to make an equivalence between "positive noumenon" and "physical reality"
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
BadgerJelly » November 30th, 2017, 10:51 am wrote:There is the complication of proposing the multiverse and saying everything exists somewhere, and then we cannot say anything does not exist only that it is absent. If I were to be purposefully argumentative and deceitful I would perhaps say something like "If I imagine it then is exists somewhere." This for me unearths the problem of positional relations.
BadgerJelly » November 30th, 2017, 10:51 am wrote:I will maintain that the meaning of "exist" matters a lot. I admit I am a little confused as to has you can say it "remains untouched", but then point to the premises.
P1. All A are B
P2. All B are C
C. All A are C
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
Lomax » November 30th, 2017, 3:47 am wrote:I'm sorry to say vast swathes of your post are opaque to me.
BadgerJelly » November 30th, 2017, 4:51 am wrote:I would be surprised if parts were not opaque.
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
Return to Metaphysics & Epistemology
Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 15 guests