The Copernican Revolution and the Senses

[Neri]

James,

I previously supplied the following quote:

"(...) Truth, it is said, consists in the agreement of cognition with its object. In consequence of this mere nominal definition, my cognition, to count as true, is supposed to agree with its object. Now I can compare the object with my cognition, however, only by cognizing it. Hence my cognition is supposed to confirm itself, which is far short of being sufficient for truth. For since the object is outside me, the cognition in me, all I can ever pass judgement on is whether my cognition of the object agrees with my cognition of the object. [Kant, Immanuel (1801), The Jäsche Logic, in Lectures on Logic. Translated and edited by J. Michael Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 557-558.]

Please read it. If you have already read it, please be good enough to read it again more carefully.

[Neri]

Hyksos,

In your view, did Kant derive the existence of noumena by pure reason (metaphysically) or by reason rooted in experience (empirically)—where experience is taken to mean cognitions that have no counterpart in the real world? [Kant’s meaning; see quote I last provided to James].

[owleye]

James,

I previously supplied the following quote:

"(...) Truth, it is said, consists in the agreement of cognition with its object. In consequence of this mere nominal definition, my cognition, to count as true, is supposed to agree with its object. Now I can compare the object with my cognition, however, only by cognizing it. Hence my cognition is supposed to confirm itself, which is far short of being sufficient for truth. For since the object is outside me, the cognition in me, all I can ever pass judgement on is whether my cognition of the object agrees with my cognition of the object. [Kant, Immanuel (1801), The Jäsche Logic, in Lectures on Logic. Translated and edited by J. Michael Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 557-558.]

Please read it. If you have already read it, please be good enough to read it again more carefully.

Yes, I've actually read this before. What Kant means by being insufficient for truth is quite simple. What we observe isn't always a true experience. It could be a mirage, for example. In any case, this paragraph doesn't connect with anything you are offering. Do you think observation confirms its truth? In any case, you'll have to turn to Kant's theory of judgement in order to get beyond mere observation.

[Positor]

unless one takes that the fantastical position that the mathematical code which comprises any noumenon is a supernatural one that does not depend upon the axioms of mathematics.

If it depended upon the axioms of mathematics, then we would know something about the content of the noumenon. Since Kant is clear that we do not, it seems his position entails that the "code" (or whatever it is) is in some sense supernatural (or "transcendental" as he would say).

I am interested in reading the full context of the statement of Kant that you quote. Please provide a citation.

It comes from the Critique of Pure Reason, section A494(?) in the first edition, and B522 in the second edition.
Below is the full text of this section and the beginning of the next one:

The faculty of sensible intuition is properly a receptivity – a capacity of being affected in a certain manner by representations, the relation of which to each other is a pure intuition of space and time – the pure forms of sensibility. These representations, in so far as they are connected and determinable in this relation (in space and time) according to laws of the unity of experience, are called objects. The non-sensible cause of these representations is completely unknown to us, and hence cannot be intuited as an object. For such an object could not be represented either in space or in time (as mere conditions of sensible representation); and without these conditions intuition is impossible. We may, at the same time, term the non-sensible (intelligible) cause of appearances the transcendental object – but merely as a mental correlate to sensibility, considered as a receptivity. To this transcendental object we may attribute the whole connection and extent of our possible perceptions, and say that it is given and exists in itself prior to all experience. But the appearances, corresponding to it, are not given as things in themselves, but in experience alone. For they are mere representations, receiving from perceptions alone significance and relation to a real object, under the condition that this or that perception – indicating an object – is in complete connection with all others in accordance with the rules of the unity of experience. Thus we can say: the things that really existed in past time, are given in the transcendental object of experience. But these are to me real objects, only in so far as I can represent to myself, that[?] a regressive series of possible perceptions – following the indications of history, or the footsteps of cause and effect – in accordance with empirical laws – that, in one word, the course of the world conducts us to an elapsed series of time as the condition of the present time. This series in past time is represented as real, not in itself, but only in connection with a possible experience. Thus, when I say that certain events occurred in past time, I merely assert the possibility of prolonging the chain of experience, from the present perception, upwards to the conditions that determine it according to time.

If I represent to myself all objects existing in all space and time, I do not thereby place these in space and time prior to all experience; on the contrary, such a representation is nothing more than the notion of a possible experience, in its absolute completeness. In experience alone are those objects, which are nothing but representations, given. But, when I say, they existed prior to my experience: this means only that I must begin with the perception present to me, and follow the track indicated, until I discover them in some part or region of experience. The cause of the empirical condition of this progression – and consequently at what member therein I must stop, and at which point in the regress I am to find this member – is transcendental, and hence necessarily incapable of being known. But this is not our concern; our concern is only with the law of progression in experience, in which objects, that is, appearances, are given.

[owleye]

Since Kant is clear that we do not, it seems his position entails that the "code" (or whatever it is) is in some sense supernatural (or "transcendental" as he would say).

Need to be careful here. Kant distinguishes between 'transcendental' and 'transcendent'. Transcendental is a metaphysical (foundational) term he uses to express how something (say mathematics) is possible. It is human related. Within each human, not in a psychological or innate sense, something is needed in order to make X possible. Kant has to reach into the possible world (and in some cases into the really possible world) in order to discover these transcendental features. Transcendent is the term he uses when speaking of the 'supernatural'.

[Positor]

Transcendent is the term he uses when speaking of the 'supernatural'.

OK, thanks for the correction.

[Neri]

Positor,

Thank you for the quote and for your startling observation.

If Kant is telling us that the means by which noumena affect the senses is supernatural—and having read the quote you provide I have no reason to doubt it—then, it is fair to say that to believe Kant, one must believe in magic.

[Neri]

James,

The meaning of the quote I gave you is clear. Kant is saying that it is impossible to know that our cognition of an object agrees with the object itself, because we can only know the object by cognizing it; all we can do is to compare one cognition with another. Hence, where truth is concerned, Kant rejected correspondence in favor of coherence.

Thus, according to Kant, it is not the case that “what we observe isn’t always true,” as you put it. On the contrary, Kant maintained that we can NEVER know if what we observe is true (in the sense that the observation agrees with the object observed).

[Neri]

In Kant’s lexicon, “transcendental” basically means “epistemic” in the sense that it refers to knowledge derived ultimately from the senses. “Transcendent,” on the other hand, refers to truths that cannot be known by sensory experience or by whatever may be derived from such experience. God, souls, all things supernatural, and noumena (as Kant uses the term) fall in this latter category. This really tells where Kant is coming from.

Because James seems to revere the Kant scholars of Stanford University, I offer the following quote from that source:

“In the Critique Kant thus rejects the insight into an intelligible world that he defended in the Inaugural Dissertation, and he now claims that rejecting knowledge about things in themselves is necessary for reconciling science with traditional morality and religion. This is because he claims that belief in God, freedom, and immortality have a strictly moral basis, and yet adopting these beliefs on moral grounds would be unjustified if we could know that they were false. “Thus,” Kant says, “I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith” (Bxxx). Restricting knowledge to appearances and relegating God and the soul to an unknowable realm of things in themselves guarantees that it is impossible to disprove claims about God and the freedom or immortality of the soul, which moral arguments may therefore justify us in believing.” http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant/#KanProThePurRea

[owleye]

In Kant’s lexicon, “transcendental” basically means “epistemic” in the sense that it refers to knowledge derived ultimately from the senses. “Transcendent,” on the other hand, refers to truths that cannot be known by sensory experience or by whatever may be derived from such experience. God, souls, all things supernatural, and noumena (as Kant uses the term) fall in this latter category. This really tells where Kant is coming from.

Because James seems to revere the Kant scholars of Stanford University, I offer the following quote from that source:

“In the Critique Kant thus rejects the insight into an intelligible world that he defended in the Inaugural Dissertation, and he now claims that rejecting knowledge about things in themselves is necessary for reconciling science with traditional morality and religion. This is because he claims that belief in God, freedom, and immortality have a strictly moral basis, and yet adopting these beliefs on moral grounds would be unjustified if we could know that they were false. “Thus,” Kant says, “I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith” (Bxxx). Restricting knowledge to appearances and relegating God and the soul to an unknowable realm of things in themselves guarantees that it is impossible to disprove claims about God and the freedom or immortality of the soul, which moral arguments may therefore justify us in believing.” http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant/#KanProThePurRea

Once again, a quotation without any reference to anything previously claimed by Neri. It's really useless to argue with him. What he says is basically incoherent. But I no longer care. He's shown his stripes and that's all there is to it. Note that the above is famous and that everyone who studies Kant is well aware of it. It represents early thinking that tells us in an over-arching way how he found his way. It corresponds to a compatibilist position relative to the topic of free-will, one made difficult because of the necessitarian aspect of Newtonian laws of motion. It represents a justification for a belief, once the moral realm is in place.

[Neri]

With all due respect, James, is English your first language?

[mtbturtle]

ok enough of the snarking from both of you. If you can't proceed like gentlemen and scholars, then we've had enough of this topic. I for one am at a loss for what this analysis of Kant is supposed to offer me, what's the point of it all?

[owleye]

My apologies. I've previously vowed not to get into this with Neri, but I guess my vow was too weak and couldn't resist doing so. I'll try again.

[Neri]

Mtbturtle,

The basic question presented in my OP is this: Do cognitions determine objects or do objects determine cognitions? The former is Kant’s so-called Copernican Revolution. The latter is the realists’ position. My critique of Kant’s position takes the following form:

A. How can Kant verify the proposition that there are “things as they really are” that are completely unknowable?

(1) He cannot support the proposition by direct experience for that would be self-contradictory.

(2) He cannot properly support the proposition by pure reason; for he denies that reason itself without experience can yield knowledge. In fact, he says categorically that the moment appearance “transgresses the bounds of experience, and consequently becomes transcendent, produces nothing but illusion.” (Prolegomena, ibid. page 40)

(3) He cannot properly support the proposition by the bald assertion that we cannot have experiences of things unless there really are such things; for this begs the question by assuming that experience refers to real things when that is the very matter at issue. Further, it is known that we do have experiences that refer to nothing outside of us.

(4) He cannot properly support the proposition that things-in-themselves exist and are unknowable because time and space do not exist; for proof of the non-existence of time and space is subject to the same limitations put forward herein. Therefore, Kant sought to advance separate arguments supporting his view of time and space.

Kant gave what he called a metaphysical argument in support of his view of space, basically as follows:

(1) Space is not derived from experience, because space is presumed when sensations are referred to something outside of us. Thus, our experience of things external to us is only possible through the presentation of space.

[COMMENT: This argument does not exclude the proposition that the reason we cannot, without space, have the experience of things outside of us is due to the fact that “space” expresses a real relation between ourselves and such things. In fact, the latter alternative is abductlvely preferable to the former in that it is far more natural and plausible]

(2) Space is an a priori presentation which underlies all experiences of things external to us; for we cannot imagine that there is no space at all, but we can imagine that there is nothing in space.

[COMMENT: It seems that many can indeed imagine that there is no space at all; for scores of physicists have imagined that this was precisely the case before the Big Bang. Indeed, it seems implausible to construct a philosophy based upon what one can or cannot imagine. I myself for example, cannot imagine a space without things in it; and, in this, I am sure that I am not alone.]

(3) Space is not a general concept of the relations of things; for there is only one space, of which all “spaces” are a part and not separate instances.

[COMMENT: Because neither space nor “spaces” can logically survive as something substantive, all that can remain is a general relation of things from which we derive space. In other words, Kant cannot by this argument exclude the proposition that space is discursive and not intuitive.]

(4) Space is given to us as an infinite magnitude, which includes with itself all parts of space. This is different from the relation of a concept to its instances. Therefore, space is not a concept but only an appearance.

[COMMENT: Because both “spaces” and space can logically survive only as a concept of a genera relation among things, all specific relations of that kind would be instances of that general relation.]

Kant’s argument as to time:

Time refers only to what is inside of us and not to what is outside. That is, time cannot subsist substantively on its own but only in our consciousness. Time is how we appear to ourselves and not how we really are. The experience of our consciousness as temporally extended is a pure a priori intuition without which neither ourselves not what is external to us can possibly be understood. We always carry time with us as a condition for our understanding of ourselves and the world in general, but time is only real to us and not real in itself.

[ COMMENT: This argument in no way excludes the proposition that time is a concept derived both from ourselves and what is outside of us-- that “time” expresses real relations in our thinking, real relations between ourselves and things outside of us, and real relations among all such things. In other words, our concept of time can very well be derived from motion, change and causation as realized by memory and can mirror and tract these conditions in the world outside of us and allow us to deal with them insofar as they present a danger to our continued existence. In fact, this alternate proposition regarding time is not only logically allowed but also abductively preferable. The idea that we are “timeless” supports the belief in the immortality of the soul, but otherwise has little to recommend it. In view of the inescapable fact that we all die, such a view of ourselves only serves to support what is no more than a superstition.]

[neuro]

so, Neri, are we going to start again from the beginning?

Please, could you tell us "what this analysis of Kant is supposed to offer" to us, apart from your opinion (apparently not shared by many users here) that

(a) Kant does not claim that noumena exist in themselves and we perceive them as phenomena through a transcendent cognitive apparatus that prevents us from knowing numena as they actually and exactly are
(b) rather, Kant claims that noumena cannot be accessed and what we perceive (phenomena) do not have any correspondence with anything actually real, so that
(c) Kant qualifies as an anti-realist

?

Does all this teach us anything?
Does it lead us anywhere?
What is the purpose of your insisting that everybody else here cannot read (at least cannot read Kant)?

I have not read Kant in original.
I have considered your argument.
I find it quite weak, because it seems to me you force possble interpretations of his words in such a way to make him appear as a quite dull guy, who did not realize he was telling nonsense; which I humbly think was not the case.

[mtbturtle]

Mtbturtle,

The basic question presented in my OP is this: Do cognitions determine objects or do objects determine cognitions? The former is Kant’s so-called Copernican Revolution. The latter is the realists’ position. My critique of Kant’s position takes the following form:

Isn't this a false dichtomy, couldn't it be both?

[Neri]

Neuro,

The alternate analysis I propose in my last post frees us from the shackles of our minds and gives us a window to reality. This is no small thing. Of course, you may disagree. That is your right. However, if you do, I think you are obliged to give your reasons.

My alternate proposal may be stated succinctly as follows:

Motion and change are real conditions of the world outside of us. Time and space are concepts derived from motion and change and are therefore discursive and not intuitive. They are general expressions of relations between real things and us and of relations among real things independent of us. Neither space in general nor “particular spaces” are substantively real but are only ideas derived from motion and change. However, time and space are well founded in reality.

Our cognitive representations of objects provide us with the means to differentiate real things from each other so that their respective motions relative to us and each other and their immanent changes may be properly understood. Our experience of these motions and changes is virtually equivalent to the motions and changes as they really are. Only a representation of real things is possible for any sentient being. There is no such thing as “an object as it really is,” for any object can only be appreciated as a collection of properties. By merely perceiving a real object, one cannot know all that may be predicated of it. The purpose of the senses is recognition not infallible identification. There is only one world, the world that includes all of us—a world of continual motion and change.

[Neri]

Mtbturtle,

To a certain extent, what you say is true. See my last post.

[hyksos]

so, Neri, are we going to start again from the beginning?

We are dealing with the startling possibility that Neri has not learned anything from all of our posts in this thread. Neri asked me a direct question (higher up), but I'm really contemplating on whether I should spend the time answering it. I'd like to see some of his reactions/affirmations to some other posts I made in this thread before I start answering direct questions. I will gladly write to anyone who shows a willingness to read.

[hyksos]

Hyksos,

In your view, did Kant derive the existence of noumena by pure reason (metaphysically) or by reason rooted in experience (empirically)—where experience is taken to mean cognitions that have no counterpart in the real world? [Kant’s meaning; see quote I last provided to James].

(Alright.. without taking up too much of my own time here) You seem to have become shipwrecked somewhere around Kant's refutation of Berkeley's idealism. Kant actually called Berkeley's philosophy, "dogmatic Idealism". He wrote some lengthy proofs against it. So if you point your boat in that direction, you will sail to more fruitful waters soon enough.

[Neri]

Hyskos,

You have not given an answer to my question because you do not have one. All the rest is dissembling and ad hominem rubbish.

[Neri]

Hykson,

I have given an explanation of the difference between Kant's philosophy and that of Berkeley. Either you have not read it, or if you have, you have not understood it.

[neuro]

Neuro,

The alternate analysis I propose in my last post frees us from the shackles of our minds and gives us a window to reality. This is no small thing. Of course, you may disagree. That is your right. However, if you do, I think you are obliged to give your reasons.

Sorry,
I actually had not read accurately the post of yours you refer to (I realize I mostly skipped the bracketed "COMMENT" parts which instead appear to offer a quite more reasonable and benevolent interpretation of Kant's ideas).

This way everything sounds much more acceptable to me.
My apologies.

[Eclogite]

[quote="[url=http://www.sciencechatforum.com/viewtopic.php?p=275222#p275222] Neri asked me a direct question (higher up), but I'm really contemplating on whether I should spend the time answering it.

On those forums on which I have moderated in the past it is a requirement, implicit or explicit, to answer direct questions. I do not know if that is the case on this forum. Either way, common politeness would make it appropriate for you to answer. Of course it would be perfectly acceptable for you to impolitely decline to answer, as that would be informative.

[Rilx]

Motion and change are real conditions of the world outside of us. Time and space are concepts derived from motion and change and are therefore discursive and not intuitive. They are general expressions of relations between real things and us and of relations among real things independent of us. Neither space in general nor “particular spaces” are substantively real but are only ideas derived from motion and change. However, time and space are well founded in reality.

Our cognitive representations of objects provide us with the means to differentiate real things from each other so that their respective motions relative to us and each other and their immanent changes may be properly understood. Our experience of these motions and changes is virtually equivalent to the motions and changes as they really are. Only a representation of real things is possible for any sentient being. There is no such thing as “an object as it really is,” for any object can only be appreciated as a collection of properties. By merely perceiving a real object, one cannot know all that may be predicated of it. The purpose of the senses is recognition not infallible identification. There is only one world, the world that includes all of us—a world of continual motion and change.

You have described your metaphysics very clearly. That it differs from Kant's is obvious to everyone.

As I noticed in my earlier post, I see that questions and problems that were raised in this thread were essentially conceptual. Different metaphysics necessarily use different concepts. Problems arise when same words refer to different concepts. Therefore it's practically impossible to compare different metaphysics on the level of single concepts. E.g., you and Kant have different concepts which both of you call "time" and "space". Claiming that one interpretation is wrong and another is right, is practically meaningless even though both may coincide in some narrow context.

Btw, as a third example of different interpretations, in the metaphysics of a former member (Obvious Leo) "time" and "space" have kind of changed their conventional role between each other.

Assuming that different metaphysics are coherent, I don't see much other ways to compare them than by premises or outcomes. Main questions would be what problems they solve and what they leave unsolved.

[hyksos]

[quote="[url=http://www.sciencechatforum.com/viewtopic.php?p=275222#p275222] Neri asked me a direct question (higher up), but I'm really contemplating on whether I should spend the time answering it.

On those forums on which I have moderated in the past it is a requirement, implicit or explicit, to answer direct questions. I do not know if that is the case on this forum. Either way, common politeness would make it appropriate for you to answer. Of course it would be perfectly acceptable for you to impolitely decline to answer, as that would be informative.

I have told Neri precisely where in Kant's writing to find the answers that he seems to be seeking. I don't know what he wants, other than some sort of confirmation of his own confusion, which he will never receive. I consider that polite enough.

Neri. Use your expensive computing device to search the Critique of Pure Reason for refutations of Berkeley's idealism. Kant calls Berkeley's philosophy "Dogmatic Idealism". So when you find that phrase, you will know you are on the right track. The other thing you want to make sure not to miss is the section Kant titled: "Theorem. The simple but empirically determined consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of external objects in space." Start there and go down. You should see some sort of proof. Further confusions are your responsibility not mine.

Green text is my officially-submitted, direct answer to Neri's question.

[hyksos]

(I was having some additional thoughts to tag on here.)

No matter what anyone says in this thread or on this forum, I cannot be made to discuss Kant and his writing as if Critique of Pure Reason was somehow published last month; as if COPR just 'hit the shelves' at Barnes&Noble. Kant wrote in the century in which he wrote. He addressed the issues and philosophers of his day, and I don't deride him for that. My reasons for posting this is the level of acrimony in this thread seems to be a symptom of an underlying problem: the problem being that some people here are pretending Kant is alive today and actively maintaining a blog and actively writing books.

Having admitted that, it must be said that links we try to establish between Kant's writing and extremely new, hot-off-the press neuroscience will be thin threads. Any correlations we draw will be loosey-goosy. We can speak only of these connections with loose historical analogies. I think being grown adults and admitting this to ourselves may help quell the emotional flames that are just now kindling in the thread.

[owleye]

(I was having some additional thoughts to tag on here.)

No matter what anyone says in this thread or on this forum, I cannot be made to discuss Kant and his writing as if Critique of Pure Reason was somehow published last month; as if COPR just 'hit the shelves' at Barnes&Noble. Kant wrote in the century in which he wrote. He addressed the issues and philosophers of his day, and I don't deride him for that. My reasons for posting this is the level of acrimony in this thread seems to be a symptom of an underlying problem: the problem being that some people here are pretending Kant is alive today and actively maintaining a blog and actively writing books.

Having admitted that, it must be said that links we try to establish between Kant's writing and extremely new, hot-off-the press neuroscience will be thin threads. Any correlations we draw will be loosey-goosy. We can speak only of these connections with loose historical analogies. I think being grown adults and admitting this to ourselves may help quell the emotional flames that are just now kindling in the thread.

Kant is part of the canon of western philosophy. He has two things going against him, however, the main one is that with the practical turn of philosophy that settled in around Quine, where the anglo-american tradition basically pushed him to the back-burner. I find this interesting in that the rise of Relativity theory was largely based on the framework of Kant's form and content, and not on the anglo-american empiricist tradition. Secondly, along the lines of hard-nosed pragmaticism we have Richard Rorty who appears to spend his waking hours telling us of the great toll western philosophy has taken because of the traditional teaching that begins with Descartes and ends with Kant, never finding anything of value in Kant, for example. Instead he would have preferred beginning with Montaigne. (Note I take this from a personal meeting I've had with him.)

In the meantime, of course, Continental philosophy has never ceased to retain Kant as a background -- required reading -- getting everyone on the same page, so to speak. Though not a phenomenologist, there are sufficient elements in Kant's repertoire to find iinks to what phenomenologists are advocating. No matter, as time goes on, Kant will have been placed in the tradition in much the way Aristotle is so placed, as a figure of scholarship, having principally historical interest. Right now, the secondary literature on Kant grows rather than recedes and so Kant is not yet done as an influential thinker. Having made him the target of my thesis, I believe I've gained considerably.

[Neri]

Hyksos,

The question I presented was rather straightforward. I will repeat it for you:

“In your view, did Kant derive the existence of noumena by pure reason (metaphysically) or by reason rooted in experience (empirically)—where experience is taken to mean cognitions that have no counterpart in the real world?”

If you know as much about Kant as you claim, you should have no difficulty giving us a simple and direct answer. Instead, you continue your pattern of evasion. If you have no answer, confess your ignorance and waste no more of our time.

[neuro]

did Kant derive the existence of noumena by pure reason (metaphysically) or by reason rooted in experience (empirically)—where experience is taken to mean cognitions that have no counterpart in the real world?”

Would
"by reason rooted in experience (empirically)—where experience is taken to mean cognitions that have an indirect (inexact) counterpart in the real world, mediated by a perceptual + cognitive (transcendent) apparatus”
be an adequate answer?