A few years ago, I attempted to publish the attached paper with several journals. After being turned down and getting little feedback, I decided to rewrite the paper which I’ve been doing ever since. I’m posting here to get some preliminary feedback prior to pushing on any further, but I do plan to make updates as necessary and try to get feedback from a number of those whose work I’ve quoted. Here's a link to the paper:
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1vGya6 ... RY8l-PgVudWhen reviewing the paper, I’d be very grateful for any feedback you might have along the lines of:
1) Is the paper understandable? Why/why not? What do you understand well? What don’t you understand well?
2) Is the overall layout and way it is presented helpful? Does the work flow well from one section to another and from one concept to another?
3) If you’re familiar with any of the references, do they make sense to be introduced where they are? Do you know of other references that might be pertinent?
4) Are the sections long enough to explain each concept or too short? Remember, the audience for this is primarily those who have an academic background in philosophy of mind so it may seem difficult to slog through at times.
5) Do you follow the predictions made at the end? This was added recently and is rather short, but the paper is already too long for some journals and I’ve seen much smaller sections in some of the referenced articles that focus on predictions.
I’d also be interested in any assistance or suggestions getting this published. Some thoughts for a next step include:
1) Post on ResearchGate.com.
2) Post on arxiv.org. I’m unfamiliar with this site though and see it doesn’t really cater to philosophy.
3) Other avenues?
I think my primary issue to this point is a lack of qualifications. I only hold a bachelor’s in engineering.
It’s a rather long paper at 12,000 words, though this includes the bibliography. I’m not in a rush to move on at this point so feel free to take your time. I don’t expect feedback on this the same way as we get feedback on other posts.
Best regards,
Dave.
Abstract: In the field of engineering and many of the sciences that use classical physics for analysis, computational schemes use the concept of finite volumes because they break down a physical system into smaller parts that allow the governing equations and the phenomena sought to become calculable. These methods follow a common reductive philosophy based on the separability of classical mechanics. This paper reviews and further refines this concept so it can be used to examine the computational theory of mind. What we discover is that classical physics fails to allow for counterfactual dependencies. To maintain these dependencies would require a modification to classical physics to include a special signal which is unmeasurable and has no physical influence. To avoid these special signals it is argued, one must identify a nonseparable physical substrate on which consciousness can supervene, and it is here we find a substrate for phenomenal consciousness and a potential way forward.
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Keywords: phenomenal consciousness, philosophy of mind, counterfactual dependencies, downward causation, emergence, compartment model, computationalism, neuron, classical mechanics physics, separability, non-reductive physicalism, panpsychism, symbol grounding problem